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ARGUMENT 
I. IF BOUNTIFUL FAILS TO KEEP ITS HIGHWAYS AND STREETS IN A 
SAFE CONDITION. IT HAS NO IMMUNITY FROM SUIT UNDER THE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION CLAUSE 
The core question relating to this appeal is the 
relationship between Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8 and §63-30-
10(1)(a). That relationship, to the extent it has been directly 
and indirectly addressed in Utah cases, was thoroughly addressed 
in Jones1 original brief. In response, Bountiful goes to great 
lengths to quote numerous cases from other jurisdictions 
regarding the relationship between their particular state and 
local statutes on this question. However, foreign case law is 
irrelevant in light of the unique nature of the Utah statutory 
scheme and the Utah cases that have already considered to some 
extent the relationship between §63-30-8 and the discretionary 
function clause. The position taken by Jones in the original 
brief is unrefuted. Numerous Utah cases indicate that injuries 
caused by unsafe or dangerous conditions of streets in Utah is a 
governmental activity for which immunity from suit has been 
expressly waived and it is not within the discretionary function 
exception of the Governmental Immunity Act. See Richard v. 
Leavitt, 716 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 
P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) and Biaelow V. Inaersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1980) . 
Moreover, Bountiful's brief presents no additional 
information by way of Utah statute or case law to support its 
contention that §63-30-10(1)(d) should be read any more broadly 
in its scope to restrict the waiver of immunity in §63-30-8 than 
the discretionary function provision. 
Bountiful does contend that §63-30-8 waives immunity 
only for defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions physically 
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located on a particular road or street. Bountiful's position is 
that any condition that makes a road or street defective, unsafe, 
or dangerous that does not actually exist on and in the physical 
road or street itself is beyond the scope of the act and there is 
no waiver of immunity provided therefor. This argument is not 
supported by the language in §63-30-8 itself. The statute 
indicates there is liability for any unsafe or dangerous 
condition of any road or street. It does not limit the waiver of 
immunity to only certain causes of unsafe or dangerous 
conditions. Certainly it is clear that dangerous or unsafe 
conditions of roadways or streets may be created by circumstances 
other than conditions inherent in the street or roadway itself. 
The facts and holding in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 
276 (Utah 1985) support Jones1 contention that §63-30-8 must be 
read more broadly. In that case a plaintiff charged a 
municipality with negligence in allowing trees, shrubs, and other 
growths to obscure a stop sign at an intersection. The Richards 
Court did not indicate that the trees and shrubs were not 
technically part of the roadway or street itself or that they 
were on private rather than public property. Such technical 
issues were irrelevant to the question of whether the growth made 
the condition of the road or street unsafe or dangerous. 
Richards held that if bushes obscured a stop sign, a municipality 
may be liable under the waiver of immunity contained in §63-30-8. 
In the present case we are dealing with the unsafe 
condition of an uncontrolled intersection of two roads. In 
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considering what is necessary to maintain a safe condition for 
such a situcition, clear sight lines for vehicles approaching the 
uncontrolled intersection are the primary safety considerations. 
A street may exist that, considered in a vacuum by itself, is 
flawless from a mechanical and technical perspective. Good 
workmanship, however, does not shield a municipality from 
liability if outside influences or conditions render the road 
dangerous or unsafe. 
II. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S41-6-19 AND S63-30-8 CREATE A 
MANDATORY LEGAL DUTY ON BOUNTIFUL TO FACILITATE THE REMOVAL 
OF FOLIAGE OBSTRUCTIONS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY. 
§41-6-19 and §63-30-8 are clear and unambiguous. When 
read together, they impose a mandatory legal duty on Bountiful to 
facilitate the removal of obstructing foliage on private 
property. Bountifulfs arguments that Bountiful1s duty was 
directory and permissive whether than mandatory once again rely 
primarily on other states1 interpretations of their own statutes 
and case law. The only Utah case relied on by Bountiful, Stevens 
v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970), is distinguishable 
because the plaintiff in that case was traveling on private 
property at the time his vision was obstructed by foliage. He 
was not using the public roads of the state of Utah or any of its 
local municipalities. 
To attempt to distinguish each of the foreign cases 
cited by Bountiful would be possible but relatively fruitless 
given the differences in facts and in the statutory governmental 
immunity schemes from state to state and from case to case. 
4 
Prokop v. Wayne County Board of Commissioners, 424 N.W.2d 10 
(Michigan 1988), cited by Bountiful in its brief, is a good 
illustration of the futility of relying on foreign cases. 
Factually, Prokop bears great similarity to the present case. A 
bicyclist brought a claim against a county alleging that the 
failure to trim a hedge row that obstructed vision and that was 
located on private property breached the municipality's legal 
duty to the bicyclist. In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed 
that the county breached its duty to order the private property 
owner to trim the hedge. The trial court granted the defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the Michigan Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
Prokop is easily distinguishable. First, the accident 
occurred at an intersection controlled by a traffic light. As 
noted above, the importance of maintaining unobstructed sight 
lines becomes all-important at an uncontrolled intersection. 
Second, it was based on a Michigan statute that was more 
ambiguous and lenient than §63-30-8 as to the standard that the 
municipality was required to adhere to regarding the safety of 
its roads. The Michigan statute stated: 
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction 
over any highway shall maintain the highway 
in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably 
safe and convenient for public travel . . . . 
The duty of the state and the county road 
commissions to repair and maintain highways, 
and the liability therefor, shall extend only 
to the improved portion of the highway 
designed for vehicular travel . . . 
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The Utah standard contained in §63-30-8 is more specific both as 
to the waiver of liability and to the condition of the road. 
Third, the Michigan language limited the duty of municipalities 
only to the improved portion of the highway. Fourth, Michigan 
had no statute imposing a duty on municipalities to notify owners 
that obstructing foliage must be removed. The third and fourth 
reasons were the ultimate bases for Prokop *s holding that no duty 
could be imposed on the county. Not only is Prokop 
distinguishable, it actually supports the plaintiff. The 
Michigan Court suggested that had there been a statute requiring 
the county to regulate sight obstructions the ruling might have 
been different. Prokop, supra, at p. 13. 
It is to Utah cases and statutes that this Court must 
look in determining whether a duty under §41-6-19 and §63-30-8 
exists, whether it is mandatory, and whether there is a genuine 
issue of fact about Bountiful carrying out its duty in the manner 
the statute requires. Having determined that the statute does 
impose a mandatory duty on Bountiful, to, at the very least, 
notify the property owner that the foliage is a traffic hazard 
and order that it be removed, and having shown through reference 
to §63-30-8 that there is no immunity from suit for negligent 
municipal acts or omissions creating unsafe roads, Point II in 
Bountiful1s brief is answered. The only remaining question as to 
whether Bountiful failed to carry out its legal duty is an issue 
of fact for a jury to decide. 
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III. THE WAIVER OF IMMUNITY UNDER S63-30-8 MAY EXTEND TO 
BOUNTIFULfS FAILURE TO PLACE TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES AT THE 
INTERSECTION, 
Bountiful goes to great length in Argument III in its 
brief to persuade the Court that the discretionary function 
provision of the Governmental Immunity Act makes Bountiful immune 
from liability for its decision not to place a traffic control 
device at the intersection in question. The problem with this 
position is that it ignores the plain language of §63-30-8 as it 
read at the time of the accident and Utah case law. As noted 
earlier, conditions other than the actual surface of the road or 
street may make the condition of a highway unsafe or dangerous• 
These conditions are not limited simply to foliage obstructing 
the vision of drivers using the street but may extend to the 
volume of traffic on the street or to warning of subtle dangers. 
It is certainly not unreasonable to suggest that 
Bountiful may be subject to suit if, based on expert testimony 
and facts about obstructions to vision, volume of traffic, 
configuration of the roads, and other facts, there is a failure 
to take reasonable precautions to warn of hazards and as part of 
that duty to take measures to provide some sort of traffic 
control device for the intersection. This is consistent with the 
language in §63-30-8 and the language in McQuillan on Municipal 
Corporations as cited by Jones in his original brief. 
As for the cases cited by Bountiful in support of its 
position in Argument III, most of the cases are from foreign 
states. For the reasons referred to above, they are of little 
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help in suggesting to the Court how this case should be decided. 
The Utah cases that Bountiful relies on actually support Jones' 
position, Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah 1988) is distinguishable because, for 
whatever reason, the parties in that case did not present §63-30-
8 in support or defense of their arguments. Because that case 
did not consider the relationship between §63-30-8 and the 
discretionary function clause, Gleave's precedential value is 
limited. 
As for Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad, 790 P. 2d 595 
(Utah 1990) , the Court held that UDOT was immune under the 
discretionary function clause from liability only " . . . for its 
failure to better maintain or to enhance the signage [at an 
intersection].'1 Duncan, supra at 601. The Duncan Court did note 
in its discussion of Bowen, supra. that " . . .the government may 
be held liable in tort to provide some effective warning or 
control for traffic at a city intersection." Id. (emphasis 
added.) Moreover, as Justice Jackson notes in his concurring 
opinion, the Duncan appellant, like the appellant in Gleave, 
never pleaded or contended that the immunity provided under the 
discretionary function clause of the Governmental Immunity Act 
was waived under §63-30-8. Duncan, supra, at 603. Justice 
Jackson took pains to point out that §63-30-8 exists 
independently from the discretionary function clause and neither 
Gleave nor Duncan should be read as limiting the analyses of 
Bowen, supra, and Richards, supra, when they suggest that the 
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discretionary function clause provides no immunity when injuries 
result from a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of a 
public street or highway. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING JONES1 
MOTION TO CONTINUE AND IN GRANTING BOUNTIFULfS SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
In Bountiful's brief, a chronology of events relating 
to discovery in the lawsuit is presented. The chronology 
reflects that Jones1 Motion to Continue Consideration of 
Bountiful's Motion of Summary Judgment was not filed with the 
Court on March 4, 1991. In fact, the Motion was signed and 
mailed to opposing counsel on February 22, 1991, four days before 
oral argument of Bountiful!s Motion. More importantly, the 
written Motion to Continue was presented to the Court together 
with making an oral Motion to Continue on the record at the 
February 26, 1991 hearing. Transcript of the February 26, 1990 
hearings, p. 13. Both opposing counsel and the Court were 
completely aware of Jones1 written and oral requests that 
consideration of the Motion be continued at the hearing of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Bountiful relies on Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 795 
P. 2d 482 (Utah App. 1990) in claiming that unless a formal 
affidavit is filed in connection with a Rule 56(f) Motion, that 
motion must fail. However, as noted by this Court in Strand v. 
Associated Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1977), the information required by Rule 56(f) need not be 
evidentiary in form but is simply to provide the Court with 
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specific reasons showing why continuance of consideration of a 
Motion for Summary Judgment is necessary• Strand, supra at 194. 
Statements were made by Jones1 counsel both in writing and orally 
at the hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and as an officer of the Court that 
provided information sufficient to evaluate the factors outlined 
in Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, supra. To accept Bountiful's 
argument that the absence of an affidavit from Jones' counsel 
dooms the Motion is to elevate form over substance without 
realizing any equivalent benefit for the sacrifice. 
The reasons outlined by Jones1 counsel in the Motion to 
Continue were (1) outstanding discovery existed, (2) the 
discovery cutoff was two months away, and (3) other factual 
issues were being explored. If this Court rules that Bountifulfs 
duty is dependent to some degree on the notice it had of sight 
obstructions at the intersection, there is no question that the 
discovery Jones sought is at the core of Jones' claim. In light 
of the April 22, 1991 discovery cutoff in the case, approximately 
two months after hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
there is nothing to suggest that Jones' discovery was untimely. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 3^ DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1991. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
/>^cJ 5. C- -r 
BRIAN S. KING 7 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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